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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of risk and ambiguity aversion - Knightian uncer-
tainty - on the choice of optimal quality and timing of market entry. Irreversibility of the
investment in product development is introduced in a continuous-time stochastic model
applying the real option literature. We consider a market characterized by a duopoly with
a Stackelberg-Nash game for quality choice. When the follower provides a higher-quality
good, the level of quality is decreasing in ambiguity aversion while it is a non-monotonic
function of the level of risk. For low levels of risk, the increase of product quality is an
e¢ cient response. Up to certain threshold level of risk, risk and ambiguity aversion reduce
the optimal quality level and increase the value of waiting when the follower supplies a
higher-quality good. The implication is that risk and ambiguity aversion allow the leader
to make a sustainable monopoly prot. When the follower supplies a lower-quality good,
there is no value for it to wait. It should therefore provide the lowest-quality good possi-
ble. In a vertically integrated supply chain rms provide higher quality, and the di¤erence
between vertically integrated and non-integrated rms is increasing in risk and ambiguity
aversion.
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1 Introduction
Miao and Wang (2011) point out that recent economic events increase uncertainty, and rms
are less sure about the evolution of the key economic variables when making decisions. In
the agrifood sector, risk and uncertainty about the market arise from several factors including
consumersconcerns about product quality and safety, macroeconomic and agricultural policies,
sanitary crises and natural disasters. All these shocks heighten volatility in agri-food prices, and
a¤ect industry protability. Competition between rms, some of which are new players in global
markets, has intensied concomitantly. Consequently, in the agri-food sector, as in the other
sectors of the economy, rms tend to di¤erentiate their product to relax price competition and
seek some form of monopoly rent (Shaked and Sutton, 1982). Examples include high-protein
hard wheat in the United States (U.S.) and Canada,1 most of the meat supply chain,2 and
product di¤erentiation and labeling in European countries.
Since the seminal works of Spence (1975) and Musa and Rosen (1978), quality choice has
been analyzed extensively. Di¤erentiation o¤ers rms market power, naturally resolving the
Bertrand paradox. In most cases, the industrial economic literature has focused on the e¤ects
of di¤erentiation strategies on market structure, rmsperformances,3 and welfare e¤ects. How-
ever as mentioned by Asano and Shibata (2011), most of these studies do not take into account
the impact of risk and uncertainty on commodity quality. Risk refers to situations where the
decision maker evaluates the likelihood of each event through a xed probability. In some situ-
ations, however, the lack of information precludes the decision maker from attributing dened
1The Neepawa variety is the varietal standard for Canada Western Red Spring (CWRS) wheat. In the U.S, the
varietal development and release system is unregulated; new varieties are developed and released by both public
and private rms. Variety is controlled in Canada by including varietal standards in o¢ cial grade denitions
and via a visual distinguishability requirement. This system enables wheat to be segregated by classes, reecting
di¤erent end-use purposes and ensures a minimum intrinsic wheat quality (see Lavoie, 2005).
2The hog marketing system in Quebec seeks to develop product di¤erentiation by allowing specialty hogs
production. A specialty hog ... is a hog that was raised and/or fed according to specic buyer demands that
imply di¤erentiation from a standard commodity hog...The specicity must be recognized by a committee that
oversees di¤erentiation in the Quebec hog/pork supply chain (Gervais and Lambert, 2010, p. 6). Réjean
Nadeau, President and CEO of Olymel, claims that Quebec pork still dominates in terms of quality, but US
pork is a serious competitor. We are still living on a reputation [of quality] that we have made over the years.
That is why we must strive to keep pace maintaining this advance. See La Terre de chez Nous, March 28, 2012.
Available at http://www.laterre.ca/ alimentation/olymel-bataille-pour-ses-parts-de-marche/ Accessed May 11,
2012.
3In a report published in 2011, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu stated that agri-food rms are under pressure
because they are operating in a sector where commodities are close substitutes. However, the major Canadian
agri-food companies successfully di¤erentiate their products to lower price competition, which explains their
solid performance. See Les A¤aires.com, April 14, 2011. Available at http://www.lesa¤aires.com/ secteurs-d-
activite/agroalimentaire/le-canada-champion-de-l-agroalimentaire/ 529648. Accessed on May 11, 2012.
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probabilities to events (Gilboa, 2009). This is often called Knightian uncertainty, or ambiguity.4
Within a Knightian uncertainty (ambiguity aversion or ambiguity hereafter) the decision maker
considers a set of probabilities instead of just one, as in the subjective expected utility frame-
work.5 Knightian uncertainty can also be analyzed within the maxmin expected utility, which
states that when a certain set of axioms are satised, the decision makers beliefs are captured
by a set of probability measures. If a rm is less condent about the future development of a
market, investment will be made with caution. Recently, Rigotti and Shannon-(2005) explore
the Knightian model introduced by Bewley (1989) and nd no-trade conditions because of the
incompleteness of preference and the related inertia assumption. De Castro and Chateauneuf
(2011) also derive a Pareto optimal results and no-trade equilibrium that do not require the as-
sumptions of constant endowments, no aggregate uncertainty and comonotonicity. The authors
explain how, in the international trade context, ambiguity aversion can explain persistence in
trade and the home consumption bias.6 De Castro and Chateauneuf (2011) also nd that if the
ambiguity aversion diminishes (for instance, with better knowledge of foreign markets), then
trade should increase.7 Ghazalians (2012) empirical results conrm the persistant magnifying
e¤ects of uncertainty aversion on home bias in the case of processed food products but not in
the case of primary agricultural products.8
Pennings (2004) examines quality choice and entry timing when future market demand is
uncertain and the quality-enhancing investment is irreversible. The author shows that the risk
increases optimal quality in both the monopoly case and in a Stackelberg-Nash duopoly model
where a leader produces a high-quality commodity. For the monopolist, Nishimura and Ozaki
(2007) and Asano and Shibata (2011) assert that the results are drastically di¤erent between
risk and Knightian uncertainty. Specically, an increase in Knightian uncertainty decreases the
value of the investment opportunity and the optimal value of quality.
4The importance of this distinction was made clear by Ellsberg (1961). See Asano and Shibata (2011) for a
detailed description of Ellsbergs (1961) experiments and results.
5See Bewley (1989, 2002) for the theory behind Knightian decisions and some observations in economics that
could be explained by this theory.
6The home consumption bias reported in the international trade literature refers to the fact that there is less
trade between countries than reasonable transportation costs would be able to explain.
7Kasa (2000) and Uppal and Wang (2003) suggest that uncertainty-aversion, interacting with information
frictions, can create barriers to international trade. Uncertainty-averse economic agents dislike ambiguity (i.e.,
situations where information is less available). Huang (2007) shows that countries high in ambiguity aversion
export disproportionately less to countries with which they are less familiar. The implication is that high
ambiguity aversion countries trade less and thus grow poorer in the long run.
8As mentionned by Ghazalian (2012: p 269) " ... primary agricultural products generally exhibit little
di¤erentiation. ... Conversely processed food products are characterised by higher levels of di¤erentiation (e.g.
intrinsic product attributes, country of production labelling). The unfamiliar attributes of foreign processed
food products are expected to have higher impacts for uncertainty-avoiding consumers".
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of risk and ambiguity aversion on the
choice of optimal quality and the timing of market entry. Irreversibility of the investment in
product development is introduced in a continuous-time stochastic model applying the real
option literature. The real option approach incorporates the value of waiting in the analyses.
Because of the relatively concentrated market in the agri-food sector,9 we consider a market
characterized by a duopoly with a Stackelberg-Nash game for the quality choice. Further, we
extend the work of Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) and Asano and Shibata (2011) on the impact
of Knightian uncertainty and quality choice and optimal timing to enter a market. Contract
farming and vertical integration vary widely in modern agriculture,10 and may have di¤erent
impacts on the optimal choices. Thus, we compare the results with and without vertically
integrated rms. Because in some cases we cannot derive analytical results, we provide a
numerical example of our results based on the hog supply chain in Québec, Canada.
Our results show that up to certain threshold levels, risk and ambiguity aversion reduce the
optimal quality level and increase the value of waiting when the follower supplies the higher-
quality good. When the follower supplies the lower-quality good there is no value in its waiting,
and it is better o¤providing the lowest-quality good possible. The implication is that under high
levels of risk and under ambiguity aversion, the model predicts a sustained monopoly prot for
the leader. Vertical integration reduces the followers value of waiting and increases its optimal
quality; hence both competition and welfare increase. We also show that in a vertically inte-
grated supply chain, rms provide a higher-quality good, and the di¤erence between vertically
integrated and non-integrated rms is increasing in risk and ambiguity aversion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the consumer demand function and
market growth, and Section 3 sets up the economic environment of the model. Section 4 presents
the main results with non-integrated buyers, while contains the results with two integrated
buyers are shown in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Consumer demand and market growth
Suppose that the buyers face demand constituted by a continuum of consumers whose utility is
given by Mussa and Rosen (1978):
U(; s; p) = u0 + s  p (1)
Where the parameter s is the good quality at price p and the parameter  is a taste parameter
that varies across consumers and is assumed to be continuously and uniformly distributed over
the interval [0; 1]. In addition, the parameter u0 is large enough to ensure that the market is
9See Lopez, Azzam and Liron-Espana (2002).
10James Jr, Klein and Sykuta (2011) provide a thorough review of forms of contracting in agri-food sectors.
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fully covered. We assume that Mt denotes the market size, i.e. the number of consumers at
time t, and that it follows the geometric Brownian motion (Pennings, 2004, Chevalier-Roignant
et al., 2011).
Given this assumption, the market sizeM is distributed according to a lognormal distribution
at each instant and has independent increments; hence:
dMt = Mtdt+ MtdBt (2)
Where the parameter  > 0 is the drift parameter,  > 0 the standard deviation the volatil-
ity of the market increase - and Btjt0 is the standard Brownian motion. Following Nishimura
and Ozaki (2007), we assume that rms are not absolutely certain about the probability of a
boom and whether a particular probability is more plausible than others, which is the denition
of Knightian uncertainty.11 In agri-food supply chains, uncertainty about the growth of the
market can be explained by several factors: concerns with product quality and safety, unfamil-
iar attributes of processed food products, macroeconomic policies, sanitary crises and natural
disasters, etc.12 Miao and Wang (2011) point out the importance of di¤erentiating between risk
and ambiguity aversion and, for Asano and Shibata (2011) ...introducing a notion of Knight-
ian uncertainty into analyses of product development is appropriate for analyzing situations in
which the change of market size in the future cannot be easily forecasted and a lot of scenarios
can be assumed.Within the framework of Knightian uncertainty and continuous time, the
singleton set of probabilities fPg is expanded through density generators . The stochastic
di¤erential equation (2) is then (Nishimura and Ozaki, 2007):
dMt = (  t)Mtdt+ MtdBt (3)
Under the uncertainty characterized by the set of density generator , the decision-maker
considers all the stochastic di¤erential equations (3) with  2 [ ; ].13 If  = 0, then the
11In a discrete time setting, Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) talk about a degree of contamination of the
condence in probability. Chen and Epstein (2002) refer to - ignorance in the context of continuous time. Such
multiple probability distributions are called Knightian uncertainty. If the rm acts in accordance with certain
sensible axioms, then its behavior can be characterized as being uncertainty-averse, which increases the size of
the set of subjective distributions (Bewley, 2011).
12Hofstede (1980, 2001) proposes a measure of national uncertainty-aversion. He denes an individuals
uncertainty-aversion as feeling uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity, and therefore valuing beliefs
and institutions that provide certainty and conformity, and national uncertainty aversion as the collectively
held attitude of a society toward uncertainty (Huang, 2007). Using this survey and an index based on industry
opacity (available information and risk level), Huang (2008) found that in high uncertainty-aversion countries,
growth is slower in industries where information is less available. See, for example, Handley and Limao (2012)
for a discussion about trade and investment under policy uncertainty.
13The set of probability measures generated is dened by } =

Qj 2 	 where the parameter Q is the
probability measure continuous with respect to P and  the density generator. For the details of the derivation
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set of priors is reduced to a singleton, and the standard analyses within the framework of risk
are in order. If  increases, it means that rm is less certain than before that the candidates
probability measures are close to P . To avoid confusions, in the paper, we will refer to ambiguity
aversion when talking about Knightian uncertainty.
3 Production environment
Consider an environment where a producer supplies a di¤erentiated good (supplier hereafter)
and a buyer of that di¤erentiated good (buyer hereafter) sells it to the consumers . Both parties
are risk averse and maximize expected prots net of e¤ort costs. The supplier produces an
output of quality s. Using this input, the buyer can transform and sell the output at price p.
3.1 Producers of di¤erentiated goods
Assume that producers choose the optimal level of output qp given the price of the di¤erentiated
product. Their expected prot is:
ep (q) = Rp (qp)  c (s) qp (4)
Where the parameter represents the level of di¤erentiation. We assume that the cost function
c(:) is strictly increasing, convex, and di¤erentiable with c (0) = 0 and satises the Inada
conditions c0 (0) = 0 and lims!1 c0 (s) = 1 (Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton, 2009). For
instance let us assume that, following the literature on vertical di¤erentiation,14 the unit cost
of producing a good of quality s is:
c (s) = s2 (5)
where  > 0. Following Kong and Kwok (2007), we allow the parameter  to vary among
the quality of the good produced. The revenue function of producers Rp is dened as:
Rp (q) = !  qp (p; s) (6)
where the parameter ! is the per unit price received by the producer.
3.2 Product development of di¤erentiated good
Assume that the investment in product development is assumed by the buyers of di¤erentiated
goods. In agri-food supply chains this assumption is plausible for two reasons. First because
of this result see Chen and Epstein (2002) and Nishimura and Ozaki (2007).
14See for example Bergès and Bouamra-Mechemache (2012).
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of their repeated contact with the consumers, sellers of di¤erentiated goods have a better idea
of consumersneeds related to quality and market development. For example, in the Canadian
wheat sector, product development is assumed by the Canadian Wheat Board. In meat supply
chains products are developed by the packers/processors (e.g. Olymel, Coop Fédérée, Maple
Leaf). In Quebec, specialty hogs are raised and/or fed according to specic buyer demands that
imply di¤erentiation from a standard commodity hog. Second, in most cases producers cannot
carry out product development because they are too small. We assume that providing a quality
of s requires a xed development cost I : R ! R: The R&D e¤ort and market penetration
activities are two examples of xed costs.15 Assume that the xed cost function is represented
as:
I (s) = }s2 (7)
where ~ > 0. The concavity of prot function and convexity of investment in quality cost
function generally allow the relationship between uncertainty and quality choice to hold. See
Pennings (2004: pp 572-573) for the intuitions and the implications of the functional form of
the investment function.
3.3 Structure of the game
The structure of the game follows Pennings (2004). We consider a continuous-time model
where the decision on when and how much to invest in quality is endogenously determined.
Let us assume that the market is characterized by a duopoly with a Stackelberg game for
the quality choice, where the leader and follower are exogenously assigned at the start of the
game.16 Stackelberg outcomes are likely when rms di¤er in size or technologies (Scherer, 1980;
Sadanand and Sadanand, 1996). Because of the high level of concentration in the agri-food
sector17 this is likely to be the case. Pennings (2004) also indicates that small asymmetries in
cost may not have much of an e¤ect on equilibrium prots, but may guarantee that one rm
moves rst. In the Stackelberg equilibrium, the leader either o¤ers the lower-quality good or
the higher-quality good.
15In hog production in Quebec, producing a specialty hog requires investing in some specic human and
physical capital that may be of little value if o¤ered to a di¤erent buyer. See Gervais and Lambert (2010) for
discussion about opportunistic behaviors prompted by investment in specic assets.
16Other examples of duopoly models of strategic investment under uncertainty are Weeds (2002) and Kong
and Kwok (2007).
17See for example James, Hendrickson and Howard (2012, Table 1).
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The timing of the game is as follows:
 In the rst stage,
First, the leader decides on price (pL), quality (sL) and the critical market size (NL);
Second, the follower set quality (sF ) and its critical market size with .NF > NL.
 In the second stage, both rm set price for the duopoly period.
Let qmL = 1   (pmL   u0) =sL denote the individual demand faced by the leader acting in a
monopoly before the follower enters. Let qdL and q
d
F represent demands for the leader and the
follower in the duopoly setting, respectively. Then individual demands are
qdL = 1 
 
pdL   pdF

(sL   sF ) and q
d
F =
 
pdL   pdF

(sL   sF ) if sL > sF (8)
qdL =
 
pdF   pdL

(sF   sL) and q
d
L = 1 
 
pdF   pdL

(sF   sL) if sL < sF (9)
Under the assumptions that the planning horizon is innite and in the presence of risk and
ambiguity aversion represented by the parameter , the expected prot function of the leader
is (Pennings, 2004; Asano and Shibata, 2011):
L =
NF
 
pdL   !   c

qdL
r   (  )

M
NF

+
NL
 
pdL   !   c

qmL
r   (  )

M
NL

 

M
NF

  I (s)

M
NL

(10)
where the parameter !, dened above, represents the cost of acquiring the good, the para-
meter c represents the marketing cost and the function I stands for the irreversible investment
in quality development dened above. From equation (10) it is clear that the leader takes into
account the fact that, given the followers action, could act as a monopolist. The followers
expected prot is:
F =
"
NF
 
pdF   !   c

qdF
r   (  )   I (s)
#
M
NF

(11)
Following the literature of strategic investment under uncertainty,18 we assume that the rm
chooses quality and critical market size to maximize expected prots. Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
18For a thorough review of the literature on strategic investment under uncertainty see Chevalier-Roignant et
al. (2011).
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and Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) show that the rst order condition for the critical market size
at which to invest is characterized by:
 bN = 
  1I (s) (12)
while the conditions regarding the level of quality is:
SN = IS (13)
where,
 
 (  )  1
2
2
	
+
q
(  )  1
2
2
	
+ 2r2
2
(14)
The parameter r is the discount rate with r > 0 and r >  ; the other parameters are as
dened before. Following the investment literature it is established that  > 1 (Pennings 2004,
p. 572; Dixit and Pindyck 1994, p 142). Equations (12) and (13) imply that the rm invests
only if the protability level exceeds the return on its investment. Equation (12) captures the
value of postponing the quality-enhancing investment, and thus captures the option value.
3.4 Structure of the economy
Given that some of the interrelations of the main parameters are complex, we follow Bergemann
and Välimäki (2002) and Wang (2010) when referring to numerical examples to illustrate the
analyses. The economic environment mimics the hog supply chain in Québec. We use data
on per capita consumption of pork for the values of the drift parameter and the standard
deviation. The past 40 years, the mean of the increase in per capita consumption of pork in
Canada was 5.14%, with a standard deviation of 0.096. When considering the past 10 years
the increase was 0.07% (standard error of 0.08). In the past 40 years, the mean increase in
per capita consumption of beef in Canada was 5.64% with a standard deviation of 0.24. In the
past 10 years, the corresponding increase was 0.018% (standard error of 0.17). We then set the
drift parameter at  = 0:05 and use a value of standard deviation of  = 0:1 as a base value of
volatility of market development. Without loss of generality, and following Gervais and Lambert
(2010) we set c = $25. In 2010, hog production in Québec was 7.7 million heads, and the value
of sales was about $1.2 trillion (MAPAQ, 2010). About half of the production was for export
markets with the USA, Japan and European Union as the main destinations. In addition, as
mentioned before, the hog marketing system in Quebec seeks to develop product di¤erentiation
by allowing specialty hog production. Even if the development of specialty hogs is ongoing, we
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assumed that about half of the total demand concerns specialty hogs. The market size of the
economy (M) is thus set to 3.5 million heads. Given these data, the investment parameter ~
was calibrated to have a value of 1:25  106. Finally, we consider a discount rate r = 0:1.
4 Optimal quality with two non-integrated buyers
Let us assume a context with a marketing mechanism that rests on two important components:
product quality (s) and the price paid to producers (!). We assume that the buyer makes an
o¤er to the producers (!; s), which implies that the producers will deliver an input of quality s
and receive a price !. We also assume that if the contract is not upheld, the supplier receives
zero payment. This marketing mechanism is consistent with Québec marketing in the hog
supply chain. As described in Gervais and Lambert (2010), when a specialty hog is o¢ cially
recognized by the di¤erentiation control committee, the buyers o¤er producers a premium and
suggest mechanisms to adjust it to uctuations in the production cost. From equations (4)-(6)
it is easy to derive that the buyer o¤ers a price ! equal to the marginal cost of production of
the quality that is ! = 2s; this will lead to zero prot for the producers.19
4.1 Stackelberg-Nash game with the follower supplying lower-quality
good
As usual, the game is solved using backward induction. We determine optimal prices rst.
Without loss of generality and because, to ensure that the contract is upheld, the buyer sets the
price to be equal to its marginal cost, we assume that the buyers decide on margin $L  pL !L
and $F  pF   !F . The two rmsprots are:
L =

M
NL
 
($L   c) qL
r   (  )M   I (sL)

(15)
F =

M
NF
 
($F   c) qF
r   (  )M   I (sF )

(16)
When the leader provides the higher-quality good, we use the demand functions dened by
equation (8) to solve for the reaction functions of the two players.
19As mentioned before, this is the equilibrium where the contract is upheld. Examples of contractual forms
with the possibility of contacts that are not upheld can be found in Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009).
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The Nash equilibrium margin functions of the leader and the follower are:
b$L = c+ 2
3
(sL   sF ) (17)
b$F = c+ 1
3
(sL   sF ) (18)
Followers optimal choices Substituting equilibriummargin (18) and the demand functions
dened by (8) in the prot function given by equation (16), the followers prot is:
F =

M
NF
 
NF (sF   sL)
9 (r   (  ))   I (sF )

(19)
The result of the prot maximization with respect to quality is that the follower chooses the
lowest quality possible, without loss of generality,
bsF = s = 0 (20)
Given its choice of quality, the partial derivative of the followers prot function with respect
to the threshold market size is negative. The follower enters the market as early as possible.20
Leader s optimal choices By substituting the followers optimal choice in the leaders
expected prot function, the leaders choice of quality as a function of optimal market size is:
sL =
2NL
9h (r   (  )) (21)
Substituting the optimal quality (21) in the leaders prot function (15) and deriving it with
respect to threshold market size gives a negative solution. The leader then invests immediately,
and because the outcome reduces to a static game, the leaders optimal quality is:
bsL = 2M
9~ (r   (  )) (22)
Under Pennings (2004) result without ambiguity aversion, the optimal level of product
quality is not a function of risk and uncertainty. In the setting at hand, an increase in both
the risk ( ") and in the ambiguity aversion ( ") induces a decrease in the optimal choice of
quality. The latter impact is also found by Asamo and Shibata (2011) in a monopolistic setting.
The ndings of this section are summarized by proposition 1. The rst part of proposition 1 is
the result found by Pennings (2004).
20See Pennings (2004) for the details.
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Proposition 1 Under the Stackelberg-Nash game, when the follower provides the lower-quality
good, there is no value in waiting to invest in quality for either the leader or the follower. They
both enter the market immediately (Pennings 2004). The follower chooses the lowest quality
possible, and an increase in both the ambiguity aversion ( ") and the risk ( ") induces a
decrease in the leaders optimal quality level, along with a decrease in optimal prices.
Proof. The rst part of proposition 1 summarizes the nding of the preceding section about
the leader and followers optimal choices. Therefore, the proof is omitted. From equations (17),
(18) and (22), @$=@ = (@$=@sL) (@sL=@) < 0 and @$=@ = (@$=@sL) (@sL=@) < 0:
The intuition of these results is that because the leader is less optimistic about the future
development of the market size and about its expected prots, it provide the product at a lower
quality and price. Increases in risk and ambiguity aversion enhance the option value of the
investment in quality. The implication is that an increase in risk and ambiguity aversion lowers
demand per consumer following the decrease in the quality of the leaders product (see equation
(8)). These results are close to those of the literature on labeling with imperfect regulation (e.g.
Sheldon and Roe, 2009) and on the value of commitment when information is noisy (e.g. Maggi,
1999). In those cases, there is underprovision of quality. The results under ambiguity aversion
contrast with those of the Stackelberg-Nash game of Pennings (2004), where an increase in risk
has no impact on the optimal level of quality when the leader chooses higher quality. The
result of Pennings (2004) conrms that the ambiguity aversion coe¢ cient is absent from the
market size increment. Figure 1 represents quality choices by the leader as a function of risk
and ambiguity aversion.
Considering that the two rms enter the market immediately, and inserting the leaders
optimal quality choice (equation (22)) in equations (15) and (16) we get the equilibrium prots
of the two rms as:
F =

2M
9~ (r   (  )) ~
2 ~
2
(23)
L =

2M
9~ (r   (  )) ~
2
~ (24)
Leaders prot is always higher than the follower one which is a classical result in the
Stakelberg-Nash game setting. Figures 2a and 2b represent the prots of the two rms as
a function of the risk and ambiguity aversion. The two graphs show that the di¤erence of
the prots between the two rms vanishes with an increase in ambiguity aversion and risk
because of low level of di¤erentiation of the leader good. In Pennings (2004) setting, there is
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no  ignorance and risk has not an impact on the choice of the leader quality of good and the
di¤erence between the two prots is constant.
4.2 Stackelberg-Nash game with the follower supplying higher-quality
good
Let us now assume that the follower supplies the higher-quality good. The demand functions
are given by equations (9), and, using equation (16), the followers expected prot is:
F =

M
NF
 
4NF (sF   sL)
9 (r   (  ))   I (sF )

(25)
The followers prot maximization behavior with respect to the market size threshold and
the quality of good allows us to derive the optimal quality and market size threshold given the
leaders level of quality. The market size threshold is:
bNF = 9 (r   (  )) (  1)
  2 ~sL (26)
Proposition 2 When the follower introduces a higher-quality good there is a value of waiting.
Given the leaders choice of quality, the impact on the threshold market size is an ambiguous
function of the value of the risk () and that of ambiguity aversion ().
Proof. The sign of the impact of an increase in risk on the threshold market size under
 ignorance is sign

@ bNF=@ = sign
2664@ bNF=@| {z }
< 0
(@=@)| {z }
Q 0
+

@ bNF=@| {z }
> 0
3775and is undeter-
mined. The qualitative impact of an increase in ambiguity aversion is determined by
sign

@ bNF=@ = sign
264@ bNF=@| {z }
< 0
(@=@)| {z }
> 0
+

@ bNF=@| {z }
> 0
375.
The ambiguity of the impact comes from the fact that the risk and ambiguity aversion
coe¢ cient have both direct and indirect impacts on the market threshold level. Figure 3 and
Figure A1 in the appendix represent the level of parameter  as a function of risk, and given
some value of the ambiguity aversion parameter. Given the structural parameter of our economy
i.e.  = 0:1, r = 0:1 and  = 0:05 we have @=@ < 0 for  > 0:77 and then, @ bNF=@ > 0.
Without ambiguity aversion, i.e.  = 0, @=@ < 0 (Pennings, 2004). Figure 4 represents
the market entry threshold as a function of risk. It shows that for some selected values of
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ambiguity aversion and in a reasonable range of value of volatility of market growth, the market
entry threshold is increasing with risk. The follower is consequently better o¤ waiting before
entering the market implying a low development of new varieties. Figure 5 represents market
entry threshold as a function of ambiguity aversion for the economy with  = 0:1, r = 0:1 and
 = 0:05. The market entry threshold is decreasing in ambiguity aversion until  < 0:491 and
increasing thereafter. Given the other parameters of the model, we can show numerically that
the followers market entry threshold is strictly increasing in risk and ambiguity aversion for
 > 0:037 and  > 1:131.
The followers optimal quality given the value of the leaders quality is:
sF =
2 (  1)
  2 sL (27)
From equation (27) it follows that the degree of di¤erentiation between the two rms is a
function of risk and ambiguity aversion.
Proposition 3 An increase in risk ( ") has an ambiguous impact on the degree of di¤erentia-
tion while an increase in ambiguity aversion ( ") decreases the degree of di¤erentiation between
the two competing rms.
Proof. The rst part holds because sign [@ (sF=sL) =@] = sign
2664(@ (sF=sL) =@)| {z }
< 0
(@=@)| {z }
Q 0
3775.
The second part follows from sign [@ (sF=sL) =@] = sign
24(@ (sF=sL) =@)| {z }
< 0
(@=@)| {z }
>0
35 < 0.
Figure 6 shows that given the value of ambiguity aversion, there a risk level threshold at
which product di¤erentiation starts to increase with the risk level. In a case of multi-product
rms, Carlton and James Jr. (2008) nd that demand uncertainty and sunk costs increase prod-
uct variety and rm di¤erentiation, which may soften competition and lead to higher prices.
Pennings (2004), Pawlina and Kort (2010) and Santiago (2011) also nd that the level of di¤er-
entiation between products is increasing with the level of risk. Product di¤erentiation is strictly
decreasing with the level of ambiguity aversion, indicating a lower likelihood of the followers
investing in quality.
If we plug equations (26) and (27) in the followers prot function, the followers expected
prot is:
F =
4 (  1)
(  2)2

M (2  )
9 (r   (  )) (1  )

~1 s2 L (28)
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Corrolary 1 An increase in risk ( ") has an ambiguous impact on the followers prot, while
an increase in ambiguity aversion ( ") decreases the followers prot.
Proof. The result comes from proposition 3 and the followers prot function.
Chevalier-Roignant et al. (2011, p 646) also note the ambiguity of the overall net e¤ect of
risk. Figure 7a-7b illustrates the ratio of the followers prot when providing a high-quality good 
h_q

to its prot when it provides a low-quality good
 
l_q

as a function of the leaders level
of quality (sL) and respectively for  = 0:05,  = 0:10 and  = 0:15. The gures show that it is
better for the follower to provide a lower-quality good when market development is perceived to
be risky
 
h_q=l_q < 1

. In that case, the equilibrium outcome will be the followers providing
lower quality and the leader higher quality. The Stackelberg prot functions are convex, which
favor overinvestment with volatility. However, the overall expected gain from the investment
depends on the magnitude of the advantages from the investment in quality, which is reduced
when the leader provides a high-quality good. Providing such a good is associated with waiting
before entering the market. Without ambiguity aversion, Pennings (2004) also shows that, for
the highest level of risk, the followers prot converges to the prot when it provides a lower-
quality good. The impact of ambiguity aversion ( ") is less clear for the low level of quality
choice by the leader, as can be seen in Figure 8. Nonetheless, the follower is better o¤ providing
low quality when the market appears ambiguous and the quality of the leaders product is high.
Waiting to provide a higher-quality good does not compensate for the loss of revenue from not
entering the market. Under risk and ambiguity aversion, equilibrium outcome converges to
the followers supplying low-quality goods. As in Pennings (2004), risk increases the market
threshold optimal value, at which time the leader can earn monopoly prots. Extending Aoki
and Prusas (1997) results, Pennings (2004) also shows that when the risk is below a certain
level, the follower enters the market very early, and the period of the monopoly prot is not
long enough to compensate for the disadvantage of supplying a low-quality good.
5 Optimal quality with vertically integrated buyers
Let us now assume that the buyersrms are integrated with those of the suppliers, where
the suppliers own all the assets. This is a forward vertical integration. Backward vertical
integration, where producers acquire the buyers, is more likely if the producersinvestment is
larger. Conversely, backward integration is less likely because the suppliersinvestment is larger
(Acemoglu et al., 2010).
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Given the suppliers prot function, dened by equations (4)-(6), the forward vertically
integrated (VI) prots of the buyers are now:
V IL =

M
NL
 
M (pL   c (sL)  c) qL
(r   (  ))   I (sL)

(29)
V IF =

M
NF
 
M (pF   c (sF )  c) qF
(r   (  ))   I (sF )

(30)
5.1 Stackelberg-Nash game with the integrated follower supplying a
lower-quality good
When the follower provides a lower-quality good, it is optimal for it to set the quality at the
minimum level and enter the market immediately, as does the leader. With the cost function
dened by equation (5), the quality supplied by the leader is now:
sV IL =
9~ (r   (  )) + 4ML + 
3M2L
(31)
where . 
q
81 ((r   (  )))2 ~2 + 4ML(18 (r   (  ))~+ML):The next propo-
sition presents the leaders optimal choice of quality under vertical integration (VI) and non-
integration (NI).
Proposition 4 Without vertical integration, the leader underprovides quality if its cost function
parameter is low and overprovides quality if its cost function parameter is high. An increase
in risk ( ") and in ambiguity aversion ( ") induces an increase in the di¤erence in product
di¤erentiation between vertically integrated and non-integrated buyers.
Proof. The rst part of proposition 4 follows the fact that, given equations (22) and (31),bsV IL   bsNIL > 0 for L < 12(r ( ))~M . It is straightforward to derive that, given (22) and (31)
we have that @
 bsV IL   bsNIL  =@ > 0 and @  bsV IL   bsNIL  =@ > 0.
Vertical integration brings the leader near the optimal level of quality from which it devi-
ated because of risk and uncertainty.Without risk and ambiguity aversion, Economides (1999)
nds that the integrated monopolist provides a higher-quality product than the non-integrated
monopolist. Acemoglu et al. (2009) obtain the same result (main e¤ect) in an imperfect credit
market.
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Corrolary 2 When the leader provides a high-quality good, vertical integration is more likely
when economic environment is characterized by risk and ambiguity aversion.
Proof. Prot functions are increasing in product di¤erentiation. Under vertical integration,
when risk and ambiguity is high, the leader provides a higher-quality good and thus increases
both its prot and that of the follower (higher prices and demand).
5.2 Stackelberg-Nash game with the follower supplying a higher-
quality good
Because the explicit solution of the rst order condition is complicated, optimization is done
numerically, using the parameters dened in Section 3.4. Ambiguity aversion has the same
impact on the waiting time. As for the case where the leader supplies a high quality good,
vertical integration increases the quality level of the supplied good. Both ambiguity aversion and
volatility risk increase the length of the di¤erence between the quality supplied by the VI and the
NI buyers. If the leader provides a lower-quality good there is value in the followers waiting.
However, vertical integration reduces the waiting time, and the follower enters the market
earlier than it would without a vertically integrated buyer. The di¤erence in the threshold
market entry level is 1
4(sF sL) >
(sF sL)
[sF (F sF 2) sL(LsL 2)]2 implying that the follower enter earlier
for sF (F sF   2)   sL (LsL   2) > 2. Let us assume that L = F = . Under vertical
integration the follower enters earlier for sF (sF   2)  sL (sL   2) > 2. which is reached for
the quality sF >
1+
p
1+2(1 sL)+2s2L

. If the leader chooses the lowest quality possible sL =s= 0,
the condition is sF > 1+
p
1+2

. Figure 9 represents the di¤erence in choice between VI and
NI when the follower provides a higher-quality good. Risk and ambiguity aversion impact the
level of quality of the VI buyer and indirectly reduce waiting time. Overall vertical integration
is welfare improving because, for a given level of risk and ambiguity aversion, it increases the
quality of the product supplied by the follower and reduces the waiting time. Non-integration
and the presence of risk and/or ambiguity aversion could explain why, in some cases, leaders in
the agri-food sector are rather slow to introduce high-quality products.21
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the impact of risk and Knightian uncertainty on the choice of optimal
quality and the timing of market entry. Irreversibility of the investment in product development
is introduced in a continuous-time stochastic model applying the real option literature. We
consider a market characterized by a duopoly with a Stackelberg-Nash game for quality choice,
21Also see Moretto (2008)
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within a framework of non-integrated and vertically integrated rms. Our results show that
up to certain threshold levels, risk and ambiguity aversion reduce the optimal quality level
and increase the value of waiting when the follower supplies the higher-quality good. The
implication is that under high levels of risk and under ambiguity aversion the model predicts
a sustained monopoly prot for the leader. Vertical integration reduces the followers value of
waiting and increases its optimal quality; hence both competition and welfare increase. We also
show that the di¤erence between vertically integrated and non-integrated rms is increasing
in risk and uncertainty aversion. Vertical integration tends to correct the underinvestment in
quality because of risk and ambiguity aversion. When the follower supplies the lower-quality
good there is no value to waiting, and it is better o¤ providing the lowest quality possible.
When the follower provides a higher-quality good, the level of quality is decreasing in ambiguity
aversion while it is a non-monotonic function of the level of risk. Vertical integration increases
the leaders optimal choices of quality and the market entry threshold.
Overall, for a Stackelberg-Nash game for quality choice, our results show that the impacts of
risk and Knightian uncertainty on the optimal quality are di¤erent. And as pointed out by
Miao and Wang (2011) and Asano and Shibata (2011) making the distinction between risk
and ambiguity aversion is important when analyzing situation where the decision maker can
not attribute a dined probability to the future market development size. In agri-food supply
chains risk and ambiguity about the growth of the market can be explained by several factors;
and the level of ambiguity aversion vary between countries and individuals. Further empirical
research is needed to disentangle the e¤ect of ambiguity aversion from those of risk implying to
account for partial identication and thereby ambiguity that does not vanish with sample size
(see Bewley, 2011; Stoye, 2012).
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Figure 1. Leaders choice of quality as a function of risk () and uncertainty aversion ()
when the leader provides a higher-quality good
Figure 2a. Equilibrium prots of the two rms as a function of risk () when the
leader provides a higher-quality good with  = 0:2
22
Figure 2b. Equilibrium prots of the two rms as a function of uncertainty
aversion () when the leader provides a higher-quality good with  = 0:1
Figure 3. Impact of risk () on the value of parameter  given certain value of
uncertainty aversion parameter 
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Figure 4. Market entry threshold (as a portion of the market) as a function of
risk with r = 0:1,  = 0:05
Figure 5. Market entry threshold as a function of uncertainty aversion with
 = 0:1, r = 0:1,  = 0:05
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Figure 6. Followers choice of quality as a function of risk () when the follower
provides a high quality
Figure 7a. Follower outcome as a function of quality provided by the leader, given
values of uncertainty aversion  and  = 0:05
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Figure 7b. Follower outcome as a function of quality provided by the leader,
given values of uncertainty aversion  and  = 0:15
Figure 8. Follower outcome as a function of quality provided by the leader,
given values of uncertainty aversion  and  = 0:1
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Figure 9. Di¤erence in the follower choice of quality when entering earlier in the market
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Appendix
Figure A1. Impact of risk () and uncertainty aversion () on the value of the parameter 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